This paper takes a closer look at the legal framework on citizenship of the Union. In particular, it analyzes the amendments that took effect at the end of 2009, due to the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Though at first sight, these seem to verge on the trivial, the present paper engages in detailed scrutiny, and hypothesizes that a more fundamental change may be perceived than is commonly acknowledged. It attempts to map the consequences of this supposed watershed with regard to both EU and third country nationals. Ultimately, it argues that the novel place attributed to the concept extends its reach further than ever before, and supplies it with a massive potential that the European Court of Justice is poised to exploit.
Introduction "[I]t is through citizenship that communities and identities are constituted. However, the concept of Union citizenship (…) can be enjoyed only by those holding the nationality of one of the Member
States. It has therefore not helped the 16 million or so (and rising) third country nationals who are legally resident in the EC." At present, the central provision on EU citizenship is Article 9, contained in Title II of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It consists of three sentences. The first of these obliges the Union to observe the principle of the equality of its citizens in all its activities, guaranteeing that they will receive equal attention from all of its institutions, bodies, offices and agencies.
The second and third sentence read:
Every national of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to national citizenship and shall not replace it.
These phrases are repeated in Article 20, paragraph 1, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), albeit not entirely verbatim. It opens by stating that 'Citizenship of the Union' is hereby established, and then reads:
Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.
Citizenship of the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.
As only this provision declares to 'establish' the legal construction, it is arguably the more important of the two. This is quite striking, as the treaty concerned contains the more detailed and technical rules of European law; thus, it could be regarded as secondary and subordinate to the general and programmatic EU Treaty. It would have been more sensible then to leave the formal creation of the concept to be regulated by the latter document, but the contrary has occurred. Naturally, this can be explained by the fact that the TFEU is the former EC Treaty, and Article 20 TFEU is the former Article 17 EC. Nevertheless, as many provisions have forcibly moved house and set up camp in a different treaty than before, the editors could have easily planted the most fundamental ('establishing') provision in the most fundamental treaty, where it belongs. 6 Compared to the law that was applicable until recently, other changes to the legal framework concerning EU citizenship are few and far between, at least prima facie. In Title II TEU ('Provisions on democratic principles'), one stumbles across the statement that the European Parliament is henceforth to be regarded as a direct representation of the citizens.
7 Also, the 4 latter are endowed with a right to participate in the Union's democratic life, and are promised somewhat vapidly that decisions will be taken in all openness and as closely to them as possible. 8 The icing on this cake is to be found in the celebrated 'popular initiative' proviso (Article 11 paragraph 4), enabling a million or more citizens to request a legislative proposal from the Commission. 9 Rather stunningly, the Union's minions receive only scant attention in the paramount opening articles of the TEU. True, 'the peoples of Europe' are being referred to twice, 10 but for a polity that professes to connect directly with its subjects and yearns for greater grassroots legitimacy, the employment of a plural ('peoples') can be considered highly erosive here. As a welcome compensation, the Union does kneel down gallantly to offer its However, the devil may well be hiding in the details, and it is too easy to disparage the pursued amendments as wholly trivial. In fact, the spectator that wants to draw his conclusions quickly is prone to undervalue, or even overlook altogether the innovative turn of phrase in the key provision: citizenship of the Union shall be additional to, and not replace national citizenship, where previously, it was held to complement, and not replace the latter.
Though one might, again, be inclined to downplay this alteration, it is contended here that it substantially exceeds the cosmetic. Moreover, the substitution of the idea of complementarity can hardly be seen as accidental, or attributed to sloppy editing; in the high politics arena of 8 Article 10 paragraph 3 TEU. 9 The further conditions and procedures are to be determined in accordance with Article 24 paragraph 1 TFEU. After a broad public consultation on the basis of a green paper, in fact in litigation with national authorities to procure a wholly domestic social security payment, the ECJ confirmed its expansive view of the benefits lying within the material scope of the Treaty: the right to be treated equally will work for those in similar circumstances as Mrs Sala, including those situations involving the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Treaty, in particular those involving the freedom to move and reside within the territory of the Member States. Thus, Union citizens were seen as falling within the personal scope of the Treaty by definition, and the migratory rights conferred therein (part of the material scope) are only some of the rights conferred upon EU citizens.
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Perhaps the string of follow-up cases constitutes European citizenship's finest hour so far. In
Grzelczyk, the ECJ extended the scope of the Treaty further, so as to encompass entitlements in the sphere of higher education that were believed to be explicitly excluded from students'
reach. 23 The claimant, a French national enrolled at an academic institution in Belgium, was awarded the sought-after minimum subsistence allowance, in spite of the restrictive wording of the applicable secondary law. baulked when Dutch rules imposed a residence condition on students before any social benefits could accrue to them. What makes this case extremely remarkable is that the disputed policy guidelines displayed a total disregard for the factual degree of integration (one of the pivotal points in Bidar), and to compound matters further, constituted direct discrimination.
They were nonetheless not seen as falling foul of the provisions on EU citizenship and the associated equal treatment rights; rather, the Dutch rules were considered justified without much ado, as they chimed nicely with the five-year residence condition in secondary law 36 (which actually did not yet apply to the case at hand), thus paying a great service to the sake greater equality and less inhibited residence rights. Below, we shall investigate the tenability of these assumptions, and attempt to provide a tentative sketch of some of the ramifications.
In sum, the Court appears to have been ahead of its time, and probably still is, in attaching prime importance to the European framework. To an extent, the Treaty authors have caught up, although it is highly doubtful whether there was any real willingness to acknowledge the fundamental characteristic of the supranational contraption; it is rather more likely they remain inimical to unwarranted further leaps forward (à la Grzelczyk). The ECJ's vacillation in at least one recent ruling could well be explained as a response to that reticence. Supposing, however, that the Court will take its cue more fully from the novel Treaty formula, the real question becomes to which limit(s) it could be taken, and to what ends it could be employed.
(Presumptive) Impact for EU Nationals
If citizenship of the Union were to become an immanent and non-contingent feature that all nationals of any of the Member States possess, and moreover, the prime capacity in all of their legal relations, the repercussions could be considerable. For starters, it seems inevitable that public authorities must then adhere to rigid equal treatment at all times, whereby any prejudice to the detriment of domestic citizens is no longer permissible. So far, the impact of Articles 17 and 18 EC has not been quite as dramatic. By and large, la doctrine regards them still as a safety net, only hovering into view when the traditional categories do not grant relief. 48 When intended to procure a right of residence, that safety net, may only be deployed when one poses no 'unreasonable burden' for the host state's public purse. 49 In reality, due to the fact that it is hard for authorities to produce irrefutable evidence that a social security claimant (either native or foreign) weighs in disproportionally, in various Member States, the disposal of sufficient resources has been made a precondition for access to benefits for the non-economically active. 50 Now, as long as Member States conform to EU law principles, most notably that of proportionality, they retain a wide discretion to administer 'social integration tests', so as to justify discrimination of economically inactive migrants (already evident in d'Hoop, and condoned in a rather extreme way in Förster). 51 Nevertheless, it is clear that, should the time arrive when any national may structurally invoke the magic words 'civis europeus sum', 52 this situation cannot last, and such restrictions may no longer be tolerable. After all, if Articles 9 TEU and 20 TFEU reinforce the equivalence of European and national citizenship, the whole safety net idea is bound to be abandoned; for if these provisions may be understood to contain a general command of equal treatment, serving each and every national of the Member States, they categorically outlaw uneven access to public benefits. Momentarily, such unevenness is in accordance with the secondary law, adopted under the Treaty provisions in their previous form. Ultimately though, taking the current phrasing to the max, a full-swing access to public benefits would have to ensue for all, irrespective of where one resides and whether one meets more specific national requirements;
for the general principles of EU law must then be applicable for everyone, entailing that national rules conflicting with the principles of equality or proportionality in whatever way must be set aside. 53 For the time being however, the reluctant approach of several Member
States prevails, to a great extent endorsed by the Union institutions -and EU nationals are stuck with a European citizenship that is more than symbolic, yet retains a residual character.
(Presumptive) Impact for TCNs
Though perhaps not readily evident, third country nationals would also be likely to gain significantly from an upgraded Union citizenship. For them, the potential plus-points appear to run along three strands, discussed in subsequent order here below. Nonetheless, it must not and Metock demonstrate, TCNs have been increasingly favoured by the ECJ, and the EU legislator has meanwhile not been blind or deaf to their needs either. 55 Let us however focus at present on the novel entitlements that could be accruing to them in the post-Lisbon era.
Firstly, it is questionable whether only EU citizens could lay claim to the protection of Article 18 TFEU (formerly Article 12 EC). After all, it spells out that within the scope of application of the Treaties, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be prohibited. Granted, it has now been relocated to a new Part Two, which carries the explicit caption 'NonDiscrimination and Citizenship of the Union'. All the same, the conjunction 'and' still sets the 53 The pervasiveness of the general principles of EU law, excluding the applicability of contrary national rules even in purely horizontal situations, was recently underlined in the rulings in Case secondary legislation at all. 61 Thus, they could avoid the hindrance of having to qualify for the nationality of one of the Member States first (which becomes a useless intermediary), and sidestep the (divergent and regularly changing 62 ) rules on acquisition of nationality. Enabling them to link in directly with the nascent supranational community of EU citizens also diminishes the presumed risk of dilution just referred to. Of course, it is highly uncertain that the political will exists to acquiesce to this brave new world, which would indeed constitute a shift of Copernican proportions. For sure, the legal framework would also have to be adapted further. Free-standing access to EU citizenship is, presently, a virtual reality at most. At the same time, the potential is there, looming beneath the surface. To increase its visibility, it ought to be poured into a mould that is somewhat clearer than the current Article 20 TFEU. Member State, which is unremarkable in light of the more specific competences discussed above; its presence in a fundamental rights manifesto can even be considered inappropriate.
Of stellar importance is at any rate Article 34 paragraph 2, which proclaims that '[e]veryone residing and moving legally within the European Union is entitled to social security benefits and social advantages in accordance with Union law and national laws and practices'.
Everyone, i.e. excluding none -Pandora's box might have never appeared more open, and it seems incredible that the Member States managed to agree on the inclusion of this phrase.
The startling breadth and bearing of precisely these types of provisions induced a country like the United Kingdom to pursue and secure a (probably far from water-tight) opt-out from the Charter. 65 However, the (binding) explanations that accompany the Charter stress that we are not dealing here with a 'right' but with a 'principle', and as Article 52 (5) ordains, these are to be implemented by legislative and executive acts taken by institutions, bodies, offices and agencies of the Union, and by acts of Member States when they are implementing Union law.
TCNs are then in all likelihood stumped when attempting to rely on it before the European Courts or a national judge, for Article 52 (5) rules out the direct effect of 'principles'. All the same, this does not denude it of operational meaning altogether, as the same provisions do make it possible that principles play a role at the interpretation of adopted acts, and in rulings on the validity thereof. Naturally, Article 34 (2) could be deployed to make the most of prospective secondary law that envisages TCNs. In addition, it offers sufficient room for some creative rule-bending and stretching when it comes to those legal advantages designed exclusively for Member States nationals. We have seen that, in the past, the ECJ has been keen to do just that, and, following the reasoning expounded earlier, has brought TCNs within the ambit of rules originally thought not to encompass them. This chimes quite nicely with the entire notion of fundamental rights, which are, after all, supposed to be universal and inalienable.
Concluding Remarks
This contribution opened with a quote that emphasized the primordial function of citizenship in shaping modern society. With that statement one can only concur. However, the excerpt also contained the reproach that the European rendition has failed to live up to its promise for non-EU nationals. This strikes one as more peculiar, as the latter were not meant to profit from it to begin with. Moreover, owing to progressive case law and legislation, the veracity of the statement has rapidly slid into decline. After the Lisbon amendments to the primary law, even the most hardened critics will have to admit that EU citizenship has come of age at long last. This paper has sought to portray the general contours of the regime and uncover some possible directions for further evolution. It has argued that those lawfully residing in the Union appear to be in for a treat. Thereby, the legal position of third country nationals -who during the past decade, were perhaps not lavished, but not neglected either -is deemed to improve as well.
The year 1992 bore witness to a historically unprecedented event, as, for the first time in the history of the Westphalian political order, a design of citizenship beyond the nation state reared its head. 66 All the same, the expectations in legal doctrine were quite low, and most scholars tended to look down upon EU citizenship as an empty shell, a new garment sewn for a non-existing emperor. 67 At the present day, hardly two decades on, a further transformation lies ahead. Although in the foregoing, we have succumbed to the lure of conjecture on more than one occasion, ultimately, the prospects outlined cannot be reduced to mere speculation.
For that, the desire for change in various corners of the Convention that crafted the 2004
Constitutional Treaty, to enhance the citizenship rules and multiply the array of available rights, has been much too evident. 68 Admittedly, the eventual outcome only partially reflects that zeal, and may disappoint many commentators once again. Yet, we must keep in mind that it has earlier reached a surprising apogee, in spite of the half-baked, not to say overtly minimalist conception in the Maastricht Treaty. As known, the Union's founding fathers sadly continued to prioritise the economic interests of individuals, at the expense of other dimensions such as active involvement and political participation in the polity, the cultivation of a sense of political belonging, reciprocal duties towards fellow citizens, and redistributive concerns. What is more, its relevance was strangely restricted to a favoured group of nationals, that is, to those EU citizens that possessed the financial and material resources required for intrastate mobility. Contrary to the historically developed, rich notion of membership in a national community, EU citizenship mainly comprised economic entitlements that were primarily designed to facilitate market integration. 69 In that respect, the authors of the revised rules put in place at the end of last year must be reproved by critics and zealots alike; for they have effectively exploded the prior economic linkages, and simultaneously succeeded to all but emancipate the notion vis-à-vis national citizenship.
In embryonic form, a rich notion of membership is now lying in waiting on the supranational plane, ready to be meticulously sculpted and polished to perfection. For good measure, perhaps commentators ought not to fixate on the (alleged) meager progress in twenty-odd years, but take the life of the European Economic Community as a yardstick, which evolved for over thirty years unperturbed by official Treaty amendment. In comparison, we have only witnessed the dawn of EU citizenship. All the key pieces have just been realigned to take the game to the next level. We now have to wait and see whether the ECJ will carry the ball again.
